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Making Doctrinal Work More Rigorous: 
Lessons from Systematic Reviews 
William Baude,† Adam S. Chilton†† & Anup Malani‡ 
Legal scholars, lawyers, and judges frequently make positive claims about 
the state of legal doctrine. Yet despite the profligate citation norms of legal writing, 
these claims are often supported in a somewhat imprecise way—such that the exact 
evidence is unclear or difficult for others to probe or falsify. In response to similar 
issues, other disciplines have developed methodological standards for conducting 
“systematic reviews” that summarize the state of knowledge on a given subject. In 
this Essay we argue that methods for performing systematic reviews that are spe-
cifically tailored to legal analysis should be developed. We propose a simple four-
step process that could be used whenever someone is trying to make objective 
claims about the state of legal doctrine, and we illustrate the value of this method 
by applying it to doctrinal claims that have been made in recent legal scholarship. 
INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholars, advocates, and judges commonly make posi-
tive claims about the state of legal doctrine. For example, a legal 
scholar might claim that there is a trend in recent federal court 
decisions to allow a particular pretrial procedure, or a judge 
might claim that most courts endorse a given legal proposition. 
These claims, however, are frequently made without a systematic 
demonstration of supporting evidence. When this occurs, it not 
only makes it difficult for the reader to evaluate the validity of 
the claim, but also may impede future legal analysis and allow 
for either conscious or unconscious bias. 
In response to analogous concerns about their literature, 
other disciplines have developed rigorous methods for conducting 
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“systematic reviews.”1 A systematic review is a method of sum-
marizing the results of prior literature on a research question.2 
Typically employed in the medical and psychological sciences, 
but increasingly being used in the social sciences,3 systematic 
reviews have four key lessons for doctrinal legal work. First, the 
researcher should state clearly the question she is attempting to 
answer, as this affects the manner in which she conducts her re-
view. Second, the researcher must justify and be transparent 
about how she defines and obtains the sample for her review. 
Third, the researcher ought to explain any weighting that is ap-
plied to the cases in the sample. Fourth, the researcher needs to 
justify and be transparent about the manner in which she ana-
lyzes the sample cases she reviews. Together these steps can 
prevent bias from case selection and improve the legitimacy of 
conclusions drawn from the review. 
In this Essay we argue that legal scholars, lawyers, and 
judges should conduct a four-step systematic review when they 
are making positive claims about the state of legal doctrine. In 
Part I we survey the lack of systematic support for positive 
claims in the legal literature and explain the benefits of greater 
methodological rigor. In Part II we discuss systematic reviews in 
other fields and their applicability to legal analysis. In Part III 
we propose a four-step process for conducting systematic review 
of legal doctrine and then demonstrate its use by applying it to 
an example from one of our own articles. Finally, we conclude by 
discussing the areas that we believe would benefit most from the 
application of our proposed method. 
 
 1 See generally, for example, Cynthia D. Mulrow, Rationale for Systematic Re-
views, 309 Brit Med J 597 (1994); Ruairidh Milne and Larry Chambers, Assessing the 
Scientific Quality of Review Articles, 47 J Epidemiology & Community Health 169 (1993); 
Gregg B. Jackson, Methods for Integrative Reviews, 50 Rev Educ Rsrch 438 (1980); Kenneth 
A. Feldman, Using the Work of Others: Some Observations on Reviewing and Integrating, 
44 Sociology Educ 86 (1971). 
 2 For a more detailed definition of “systematic review,” see Amit X. Garg, Dan 
Hackam, and Marcello Tonelli, Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis: When One Study 
Is Just Not Enough, 3 Clinical J Am Society Nephrology 253, 253 (2008) (“A systematic 
review uses a process to identify comprehensively all studies for a specific focused ques-
tion (drawn from research and other sources), appraise the methods of the studies, 
summarize the results, present key findings, identify reasons for different results across 
studies, and cite limitations of current knowledge.”). 
 3 See, for example, id at 253–54 (discussing systematic reviews in nephrology and 
other medical fields); Jeffrey C. Valentine, Therese D. Pigott, and Timothy Lau, System-
atic Reviewing and Meta-Analysis, in James D. Wright, ed, 23 International Encyclope-
dia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 906, 906–09 (Elsevier 2d ed 2015) (discussing the 
steps of systematic reviews in the context of social science questions). 
 2017] Making Doctrinal Work More Rigorous 39 
 
I.  THE CASE FOR INCREASED RIGOR 
We begin by surveying unsystematic claims about the state 
of legal doctrine, then go on to explain why, even if the claims 
are true, there are still benefits to more systematic review. 
A. Examples 
Lawyers regularly make claims about the law, and in par-
ticular about case law. Indeed, it might be one of the research 
tasks that they are most frequently paid to do. And while much 
legal scholarship is more normative, claims about the law are 
still common. For example, a civil procedure scholar may argue 
that a particular rule for class action cases is the increasingly 
prevailing view in federal courts, or a public law scholar may 
discuss the administrability problems created by a trend in state 
constitutional law. Yet those scholars might point to only two or 
three cases as evidence of the trend, and provide no information 
about the universe from which they were chosen. 
These are not just hypothetical examples—both are from re-
cent law review articles. We stress that in each case, the authors 
may well be right. Indeed, we have no particular reason to think 
that these experts in their fields are wrong. And by describing 
these examples, we do not mean to criticize them for failing to 
adhere to an existing standard of proof or citation (which is why 
we do not name them here). In fact, our argument is that these 
examples are not unique, but instead illustrative of a broad 
pattern. 
To get a better sense of what kind of evidence is provided to 
establish legal claims, we reviewed every article published in 
the last completed volume of ten top law reviews.4 For each arti-
cle, we had a research assistant read the abstract and record 
any claim about the state of legal doctrine.5 The research assis-
tant then read the article and recorded the evidence that was 
 
 4 We set out to analyze the flagship law reviews of the ten highest-ranked schools 
in the 2017 US News & World Report ranking of law schools. See Best Law Schools (US 
News & World Report 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6NJ2-NJGE. Because the flag-
ship journals of two schools—the University of Pennsylvania Law Review and the Virginia 
Law Review—did not consistently have abstracts for their articles, we skipped these 
schools in our analysis and moved to the next schools on the list.  
 5 We focused on doctrinal claims made in the abstract because our goal was to 
identify doctrinal claims that were central to the article’s argument. The abstracts of 
some articles contained multiple doctrinal claims, and each doctrinal claim was counted 
independently. 
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provided as support for those claims. Finally, we coded the sup-
port provided for the doctrinal claim into one of three categories: 
citing one or zero cases for support; citing multiple cases as sup-
port; or conducting some form of a systematic review (that is, de-
fining the entire set of cases that was relevant to the claim and 
the evidence to support it). 
The results of this research are presented in Table 1. The 
analysis suggests that roughly 45 percent (56 of 127) of articles 
included a claim about the state of legal doctrine in the abstract. 
Of these 56 articles, only 25 percent (14 of 56) provided any form 
of systematic review to support the doctrinal claim. The rest of 
the articles provided string cites to cases (and occasionally aca-
demic articles as well), but did not explain how they identified 
the universe of cases or whether the cases were representative. 
This strikes us as suboptimal. The norms of citation in legal 
academia ought to be designed to give nonexpert readers a 
chance to test those claims and a sense of how much confidence 
those claims deserve. Again, we do not fault anybody for failing 
to adhere to a norm that does not yet exist. But our suggestion is 
that it would be good for legal academia to develop a standard 
that helps legal analysts more rigorously see and more persua-
sively show what the law is. 
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TABLE 1.  SUPPORT FOR DOCTRINAL CLAIMS IN RECENT VOLUMES 
OF TEN MAJOR LAW REVIEWS 
   
Support for the Doctrinal 
Claim 
Journal 
Articles in 
Volume 
Doctrinal 
Claims in 
Abstracts 
≤ 1 
Case 
Multiple 
Cases 
Systematic 
Review 
California Law Review  
(volume 103) 14 4 1 3 0 
Columbia Law Review  
(volume 115) 10 5 1 3 1 
Duke Law Journal  
(volume 65) 14 8 0 6 2 
Harvard Law Review  
(volume 129) 7 3 0 3 0 
Michigan Law Review  
(volume 114) 14 12 0 10 2 
Northwestern University Law Review  
(volume 110) 
11 9 0 6 3 
NYU Law Review  
(volume 90) 
13 10 0 9 1 
Stanford Law Review  
(volume 67) 
13 4 2 1 1 
The University of Chicago Law Review  
(volume 82) 
15 7 0 4 3 
Yale Law Journal  
(volume 124) 
16 7 0 6 1 
Total 127 69 4 51 14 
 
Although this analysis focused on legal scholarship, we also 
see the same problems in more formal academic output, such as 
the Restatements of Law published by the American Law Insti-
tute. The Restatements have long been an important and widely 
cited resource in American law,6 and a recent volume has been 
given “the highest praise” for its “clear and careful exposition of 
the law.”7 
 
 6 See Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum L Rev 503, 510 
n 35 (2006) (“[C]ourts continue to treat the Restatements as presumptively accurate 
summaries of general American jurisprudence.”). See also Bennett Boskey, The American 
Law Institute: A Glimpse at Its Future, 12 Green Bag 2d 255, 258 (2009) (“It is fair to say 
that, on the whole (though of course not 100 percent of the time), the Restatement Second 
became a benign influence that moved the law along progressively and toward greater 
certainty but without undue disruption.”). 
 7 Ben Kremer, Book Review, 35 Melb U L Rev 1197, 1215 (2011) (praising the Re-
statement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, which was published in 2011). 
See also Lionel Smith, Book Review, 57 McGill L J 629, 629, 632–33 (2012) (same). 
 42 The University of Chicago Law Review [84:37 
   
But that very same volume has proven controversial in the 
courts. In a recent Supreme Court case, the justices divided over 
whether to accept a special master’s decision that had relied 
heavily on the third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust En-
richment.8 The majority adopted the master’s recommendation, 
repeatedly citing the Restatement,9 while a dissent complained 
that the Restatement “lacks support in the law,” would “alter 
the doctrinal landscape of contract law,” and had not been relied 
on by courts.10 
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote separately to criticize the Re-
statement even more pointedly. “[M]odern Restatements,” he 
said, “must be used with caution.”11 They “have abandoned the 
mission of describing the law,” and contain sections “that should 
be given no weight whatever as to the current state of the law.”12 
Hence, he concluded, “it cannot safely be assumed, without fur-
ther inquiry, that a Restatement provision describes rather than 
revises current law.”13 
The power of these criticisms was exacerbated by the meth-
odological ambiguity of the Restatements—when do they de-
scribe the law and when do they aim to revise it? But the  
American Law Institute may be trying to do better. In 2015, the 
Institute adopted new principles clarifying the “four principal el-
ements” of the Restatement process, two of which are descriptive 
(“to ascertain the nature of the majority rule” and “to ascertain 
trends in the law”) and two of which are normative (determining 
what rule would produce more coherence or be more desirable 
overall).14 While “the relative weighing of these considerations” is 
 
 8 See Kansas v Nebraska, 135 S Ct 1042, 1056–58 (2015); id at 1064 (Scalia con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); id at 1068–69 (Thomas concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 9 Id at 1056–58. 
 10 Id at 1068–69 (Thomas concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Caprice 
Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement for Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation 
Damages, 42 Loyola LA L Rev 131, 134 (2008). 
 11 Kansas, 135 S Ct at 1064 (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part). Iron-
ically, the one original Restatement that Scalia cited as an example of trustworthy 
craft—the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws—is one that had been singled out for op-
probrium by a recent officer at the American Law Institute. See Boskey, 12 Green Bag 
2d at 257 (cited in note 6) (“[T]he judiciary and the bar welcomed the help of most of the 
Restatement First (possibly excepting the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, for which 
the ideologically-imprisoned Professor Joseph H. Beale had been the reporter).”). 
 12 Kansas, 135 S Ct at 1064 (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 13 Id (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 14 Capturing the Voice of The American Law Institute: A Handbook for ALI Reporters 
and Those Who Review Their Work *5 (ALI 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6ZY8-MVFW. 
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“art and not science,” the Institute also acknowledges that it 
“needs to be clear about what it is doing.”15 And more specifical-
ly, Professors Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar, and Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler are writing a new Restatement of the Law, 
Consumer Contracts using principles analogous to the ones we 
discuss here.16 These are great steps. Our goal is to assist and 
encourage these approaches. 
B. The Value of a More Rigorous Approach 
Even if a given claim about legal doctrine is correct, there 
are benefits to establishing the claim in a more rigorous way. 
We will briefly mention five.17 
First, a more rigorous demonstration of evidence makes it 
easier for readers to evaluate whether the ultimate claims are 
true or false. When less comprehensive support is provided, 
readers instead rely on their outside knowledge or on the au-
thor’s credibility as evidence for the validity of the claim. Ex-
pecting readers to rely on these proxies is problematic because 
not everyone will have the same outside knowledge or view of 
the author’s reputation. Using reputation as a proxy also invites 
ad hominem attacks on the author’s credibility. 
Second, a more rigorous demonstration of evidence makes it 
easier for readers to assess how much uncertainty is associated 
with a given claim. For example, it may be true that courts gen-
erally agree on a point of law, but valuable to know how many 
cases have disagreed. Similarly, it is valuable to know whether a 
trend has been shown only in certain courts, or in certain years. 
This evidence helps a reader understand the degree of uncer-
tainty associated with a claim, and also know the scope condi-
tions of when that claim is valid.18 
Third, providing more complete support for claims can reduce 
error. Even authors who are fairly confident in their knowledge 
make mistakes. When authors undertake to demonstrate their 
 
We thank Professor Richard Revesz for calling the adoption of these principles to our 
attention. 
 15 Id at *6. 
 16 See Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar, and Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Searching 
for the Common Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Con-
tracts, 84 U Chi L Rev 7, 15–18 (2017). 
 17 These benefits largely parallel the arguments that have been used to motivate the 
transparency and replication movement that has been taking place in the social sciences. 
See Lee Epstein and Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U Chi L Rev 1, 38–54 (2002). 
 18 See id at 80–91. 
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work, they will be less likely to make a mistakenly false state-
ment. This logic has been one of the reasons that quantitative 
researchers are increasingly expected to provide their data and 
code. Simply put, the original researchers will be more careful 
when they know it will be easier for future researchers to double-
check their work. 
Fourth, more complete documentation of support increases 
general progress in the field. Both common-law legal reasoning 
and research are social enterprises in that they build on work 
from the past. When authors do not document the support for 
their claims, however, people trying to answer the same ques-
tions in the future have to recreate their work. Because research 
is a social enterprise, research norms should support this kind of 
documentation, just as journals and funding agencies increas-
ingly require empirical researchers to publish their data.19 
Fifth, providing such demonstrations can help to reduce ac-
tual or perceived bias.20 A large body of scholarship has studied 
the role that political ideology has on legal decision-making. 
This literature has consistently found that the political views of 
judges predict their decisions,21 and more recently has even 
found that the political views of law professors predict the con-
clusions they reach in their scholarship.22 One way to help re-
duce the risk or perception of bias is to provide the evidence that 
the claim is based on. 
II.  SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 
In this Part, we discuss the history and justifications for sys-
tematic review, explain the steps of systematic reviews, and dis-
cuss why or why not it might be an appropriate model for doctri-
nal work. The last task is the most critical, as systematic review 
is not a perfect fit for doctrinal work, so only steps that are prof-
itably imported into analysis of case law should be recommended. 
 
 19 See id at 38. 
 20 Garg, Hackam, and Tonelli, 3 Clinical J Am Society Nephrology at 253 (cited in 
note 2). 
 21 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein and Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Adminis-
trative Law, 58 Duke L J 2193, 2199–2208 (2009). See also Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. 
Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U Chi L Rev 831, 836–40 (2008) (reviewing the 
literature). 
 22 See Adam S. Chilton and Eric A. Posner, An Empirical Study of Political Bias in 
Legal Scholarship, 44 J Legal Stud 277, 286–93 (2015). 
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A. History and Justification 
The sciences, especially the biological and psychological sci-
ences, have long recognized the need for a methodology to syn-
thesize the results of prior research on a scientific question.23 An 
individual study may have a limited sample and thus limited 
statistical power to answer a research question. Moreover, its 
specific conclusions may be bound by the specific circumstances 
in which it was conducted. By contrast, a review could aggregate 
the data and contexts from multiple studies to yield both a more 
precise and a more generalizable study.24 The intellectual chal-
lenge of finding a method to combine results from multiple stud-
ies has long attracted the attention of leading statisticians, in-
cluding Professor Karl Pearson and Sir Ronald Fisher in the 
early twentieth century.25 A famous early example is Pearson’s 
effort to synthesize a number of studies that examined the value 
of enteric fever inoculation in 1904.26 
Demand for a method for synthesizing studies was initially 
limited, however, because there were simply too few medical 
studies conducted to be synthesized and because medical prac-
tice was informal and decentralized. As reliable research designs 
developed—especially the randomized controlled trial—and 
computing power increased, more and more primary research 
was conducted.27 Moreover, in the 1970s, a movement emerged 
that argued that medical practice should be driven by research 
evidence and not physicians’ idiosyncratic personal experiences 
or hunches.28 
 
 23 See, for example, Garg, Hackam, and Tonelli, 3 Clinical J Am Society Nephrology 
at 253–54 (cited in note 2); Valentine, Pigott, and Lau, Systematic Reviewing and Meta-
Analysis at 906–09 (cited in note 3). 
 24 See Garg, Hackam, and Tonelli, 3 Clinical J Am Society Nephrology at 253–54 
(cited in note 2); Valentine, Pigott, and Lau, Systematic Reviewing and Meta-Analysis at 
906 (cited in note 3). 
 25 See generally, for example, Karl Pearson, Report on Certain Enteric Fever Inocu-
lation Statistics, Brit Med J 1243 (Nov 5, 1904) (presenting an early effort to combine 
results from different sources). See also R.A. Fisher, Statistical Methods for Research 
Workers 99 (Oliver & Boyd 14th ed 1970) (originally published 1925) (“[I]t sometimes 
happens that although few or [no statistical tests] can be claimed individually as signifi-
cant, yet the aggregate gives an impression that the probabilities are on the whole lower 
than would often have been obtained by chance.”). 
 26 See generally Pearson, Brit Med J 1243 (cited in note 25). 
 27 Garg, Hackam, and Tonelli, 3 Clinical J Am Society Nephrology at 253–54 (cited 
in note 2). 
 28 See, for example, A.L. Cochrane, Effectiveness and Efficiency: Random Reflec-
tions on Health Services 20–22 (Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust 1972). 
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One of the principal products of the evidence-based medicine 
movement is the Cochrane Collaboration, which promotes the 
development of a rigorous methodology for synthesis, also known 
as “systematic reviews,” and hosts an online database of reviews 
of prior research.29 The need to define best practices for system-
atic reviews is now embraced widely in the medical literature, 
which has generated consensus statements on how such reviews 
ought to be conducted.30 
The primary alternative methodology to the systematic re-
view is the narrative review. A narrative review is a mainly 
qualitative, critical examination of the prior literature on a sub-
ject.31 The main criticism of this methodology—and thus the jus-
tification for systematic reviews—is that the authors have dis-
cretion to select which medical studies they review and how they 
interpret the studies they select. This discretion can lead to con-
firmation bias—authors select articles that tend to reinforce the 
authors’ priors.32 Moreover, the narrative review does little to 
address the problem of publication bias, which is the tendency 
for papers with less interesting results—usually results showing 
no effect, also known as null results—not to be published.33 This 
omission leads to overestimates of correlations, which often 
means the reviews will conclude that treatments have effects 
even when they actually may not.34 
 
 29 See About Us (Cochrane Collaboration), archived at http://perma.cc/A8W6-BNVL. 
 30 See generally, for example, David Moher, et al, Preferred Reporting Items for Sys-
tematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement, 151 Annals Internal Med 
264 (2009); Donna F. Stroup, et al, Meta-Analysis of Observational Studies in Epidemiol-
ogy: A Proposal for Reporting, 283 JAMA 2008 (2000); David Moher, et al, Improving the 
Quality of Reports of Meta-Analyses of Randomised Controlled Trials: The QUOROM 
Statement, 354 Lancet 1896 (1999). 
 31 See Garg, Hackam, and Tonelli, 3 Clinical J Am Society Nephrology at 253 (cited 
in note 2). 
 32 See Julia H. Littell, Evidence-Based or Biased? The Quality of Published Reviews 
of Evidence-Based Practices, 30 Children & Youth Serv Rev 1299, 1300 (2008); Garg, 
Hackam, and Tonelli, 3 Clinical J Am Society Nephrology at 253 (cited in note 2). 
 33 See Philippa J. Easterbrook, et al, Publication Bias in Clinical Research, 337 
Lancet 867, 868–71 (1991); Jerome M. Stern and R. John Simes, Publication Bias: Evi-
dence of Delayed Publication in a Cohort Study of Clinical Research Projects, 315 Brit 
Med J 640, 642–45 (1997). 
 34 See Lasse M. Schmidt and Peter C. Gøtzsche, Of Mites and Men: Reference Bias 
in Narrative Review Articles; A Systematic Review, 54 J Fam Prac 334, 336 (2005) (find-
ing that narrative reviews of the studied interventions were overly positive in their as-
sessments of treatments relative to systematic reviews and clinical trials). 
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B. Steps in a Systematic Review 
Systematic reviews address these biases with four basic 
steps. First, a review’s author clearly defines the question she 
seeks to answer.35 For example, what is the value of bariatric 
surgery for reducing obesity?36 This helps ensure that the author 
stays on target when searching for relevant literature. Although 
it may be too obvious to need stating, a major cause of bias is an 
author answering a different question than the one that moti-
vated a review.37 
Second, the author conducts an exhaustive search for rele-
vant studies. In order for readers to judge how well the search 
was done, the author should be explicit about the databases 
searched, the search terms used, and any inclusion or exclusion 
criteria applied.38 The latter are criteria that determine whether 
a study falls within the ambit of her search or is to be dropped 
because it does not.39 Disclosures about the search methods also 
allow the reader to judge the potential for bias in the review40 
and the development of “best practices” for search. The literature 
search step is crucial because an important source of confirmation 
bias is the omission of relevant studies that may disagree with 
 
 35 See Valentine, Pigott, and Lau, Systematic Reviewing and Meta-Analysis at 906–
07 (cited in note 3); Denise O’Connor, Sally Green, and Julian P.T. Higgins, eds, Defining 
the Review Question and Developing Criteria for Including Studies, in Julian P.T. Higgins 
and Sally Green, eds, Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions 83, 
91–93 (Wiley-Blackwell 2008); Khalid S. Khan, et al, Five Steps to Conducting a System-
atic Review, 96 J Royal Society Med 118, 118–19 (2003). 
 36 See Henry Buchwald, et al, Bariatric Surgery: A Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis, 292 JAMA 1724, 1724–25 (2004). 
 37 See Mark Crowther, Wendy Lim, and Mark A. Crowther, Systematic Review and 
Meta-Analysis Methodology, 116 Blood 3140, 3141 (2010) (“A major cause of bias in a sys-
tematic review is answering a different question to that originally asked.”). 
 38 See Carol Lefebvre, Eric Manheimer, and Julie Glanville, Searching for Studies, 
in Higgins and Green, eds, Cochrane Handbook 95, 95 (cited in note 35); Julian P.T. 
Higgins and Jonathan J. Deeks, eds, Selecting Studies and Collecting Data, in Higgins 
and Green, eds, Cochrane Handbook 151, 151 (cited in note 35) (“Methods used for these 
decisions must be transparent.”); Khan, et al, 96 J Royal Society Med at 119–20 (cited in 
note 35). 
 39 See, for example, Harriette G.C. Van Spall, et al, Eligibility Criteria of Random-
ized Controlled Trials Published in High-Impact General Medical Journals: A Systematic 
Sampling Review, 297 JAMA 1233, 1233–34 (2007). 
 40 Garg, Hackam, and Tonelli, 3 Clinical J Am Society Nephrology at 253 (cited in 
note 2) (“In a systematic review, all decisions used to compile information are meant to 
be explicit, allowing the reader to gauge for him- or herself the quality of the review pro-
cess and the potential for bias.”). 
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the author’s prior beliefs about the correct answer to her re-
search question.41 
Third, the author appraises the quality of the studies that 
she has gathered.42 This is different than exclusion criteria, 
which are typically based on explicit criteria like whether the 
studies look at the right treatment, the target patient popula-
tion, the intended outcome, etc. The quality appraisal looks in-
stead at things like the methodology employed in the study (for 
example, was it an observational study or a randomized con-
trolled trial,43 or was it double-blind, single-blind, or not blinded44). 
This step is used to increase the weight of methodologically 
sound studies in the author’s subsequent synthesis of the evi-
dence across studies. 
Finally, the author synthesizes the results of the different 
studies that survive. The author should be explicit about the 
methodology she uses to synthesize the study.45 For example, 
she may use a voting method in which she simply counts the 
number of studies that find positive impacts of a treatment and 
those that do not and then reports what the majority of studies 
find, perhaps with different votes for different classes of studies, 
with classes defined by the quality of the study.46 She may be even 
more rigorous and extract the statistical results from each and 
combine them using meta-analysis, a quantitative methodology 
 
 41 See Littell, 30 Children & Youth Serv Rev at 1300 (cited in note 32). See also 
Garg, Hackam, and Tonelli, 3 Clinical J Am Society Nephrology at 256–57 (cited in note 
2) (arguing that more comprehensive searches also reduce the risk of publication bias). 
 42 See, for example, Khan, et al, 96 J Royal Society Med at 120–21 (cited in note 
35); Julian P.T. Higgins and Douglas G. Altman, eds, Assessing Risk of Bias in Included 
Studies, in Higgins and Green, eds, Cochrane Handbook 187, 187 (cited in note 35). 
 43 An observational study looks retrospectively at outcomes from treatments that 
patients chose, while a randomized controlled trial randomly assigns patients to treat-
ment to address selection bias. See Miquel Porta, ed, A Dictionary of Epidemiology 203, 
238 (Oxford 6th ed 2014). 
 44 A single blind of the study subject prevents the subject from changing her behav-
ior in response to the treatment, including dropping out of the study. Such behavior in-
troduces selection effects due to either unobservable behavior while on treatment or un-
raveling of the benefit of random assignment. A single blind of the investigator prevents 
the investigator from seeing what treatment the patient received in order to limit the 
measurement error wherein the investigator’s measurement of (especially subjective) 
outcomes reflects her priors about the value of a treatment. A double-blind study blinds 
both the subject and the investigator. See id at 27. 
 45 See Khan, et al, 96 J Royal Society Med at 121 (cited in note 35). 
 46 See Philip Davies, The Relevance of Systematic Reviews to Educational Policy 
and Practice, 26 Oxford Rev Educ 365, 367–68 (2000) (describing the voting method). See 
also Valentine, Pigott, and Lau, Systematic Reviewing and Meta-Analysis at 908 (cited in 
note 3) (describing broadly the process of coding and synthesizing sources). 
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for combining summary statistics or even the data from multiple 
studies.47 The author should also be explicit about how she 
thinks publication bias may affect the conclusions she is able to 
draw. Obviously, the better the method of synthesis the author 
employs, the better the review. However, being explicit about 
the method is almost as important as the method itself, because 
transparency allows others to replicate the review author’s 
work, ensuring that the review was not manipulated and in-
creasing confidence in the review’s conclusions.48 
C. An Appropriate Model for Doctrinal Work? 
Although much of the impetus for development of a method-
ology for systematic reviews comes from the biological and psy-
chological sciences, it would seem to be of value to any field 
wherein there is a need for synthesizing the results from multi-
ple inquiries into the same issue. One of the early converts to 
systematic reviews was the public policy literature, which set up 
the Campbell Collaboration to support and disseminate such re-
views of policy interventions, especially in the fields of educa-
tion, crime and justice, social welfare, and international devel-
opment.49 Efforts have also been made to import this methodology 
into management science50 and even software engineering.51 
It would seem that legal research, especially doctrinal work, 
would be a natural candidate for application of systematic re-
view. As noted above, many scholars make descriptive claims 
about the law, and that work may be vulnerable to conscious or 
unconscious bias because the author neglects cases that do not 
 
 47 Professors Gene V. Glass and Mary Lee Smith were among the first researchers 
to refer to their work as a meta-analysis. See, for example, Gene V. Glass and Mary Lee 
Smith, Meta-Analysis of Research on Class Size and Achievement, 1 Educ Eval & Pol 
Analysis 2, 3 (Jan 1979). Details of how to conduct meta-analyses may be found in 
Jonathan J. Deeks, Julian P.T. Higgins, and Douglas G. Altman, eds, Analysing Data 
and Undertaking Meta-Analyses, in Higgins and Green, eds, Cochrane Handbook 243 
(cited in note 35). 
 48 See Garg, Hackam, and Tonelli, 3 Clinical J Am Society Nephrology at 253 (cited 
in note 2); Valentine, Pigott, and Lau, Systematic Reviewing and Meta-Analysis at 909 
(cited in note 3). 
 49 See About Us (Campbell Collaboration), archived at http://perma.cc/J2XQ-XP4U. 
 50 See generally, for example, David Tranfield, David Denyer, and Palminder 
Smart, Towards a Methodology for Developing Evidence-Informed Management 
Knowledge by Means of Systematic Review, 14 Brit J Mgmt 207 (2003). 
 51 See generally, for example, Jorge Biolchini, et al, Systematic Review in Software 
Engineering (COPPE/UFRJ/PESC, Systems Engineering and Computer Science Depart-
ment Technical Report RT–ES 679/05, May 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/Q5T9-J3WS. 
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fit.52 Readers of doctrinal work cannot assess any bias from this 
case selection process, and can compound the problem by citing 
uncritically the conclusions of the doctrinal analysis in their own 
legal analysis. 
The mere need to synthesize prior work, however, is not suf-
ficient for justifying the wholesale importation of the methodology 
of systematic reviews. There are important differences between 
the medical sciences, for which the approach was developed, and 
doctrinal analysis. First, medical studies are quantitative while 
legal cases are qualitative. It is more difficult to aggregate or 
combine qualitative research. Second, medical studies have posi-
tive aims (for example, figuring out whether a treatment works 
or not), while legal analysis often embeds normative aims (for 
example, arguing that one rule is better than another).53 
These differences justify caution when translating elements 
of systematic reviews to doctrinal work, but do not necessarily 
justify ignoring entirely the lessons of the methodology. The fact 
that prior cases are qualitative does not at present prevent law-
yers and legal academics from drawing conclusions from prior 
cases about what courts are likely to do in future cases. The les-
son we should learn from systematic reviews is that, even when 
conducting qualitative synthesis, an author should be clear 
about which cases made her sample. This will reduce the risk 
that the author draws incorrect conclusions because her qualita-
tive synthesis ignored certain relevant cases, and allow future 
researchers to know how to expand on or replicate the author’s 
claims. She should also be clear about the sorts of logical steps 
she took when conducting her qualitative synthesis (for exam-
ple, which cases she valued more because of the judge or because 
the context was more generalizable). 
Likewise, the fact that legal work is often normative54 is not 
an argument against greater rigor during case selection and 
transparency about the nature of legal analysis. Indeed it is the 
opposite. Readers may mistrust a positive argument if they sus-
pect that the author is smuggling in normative analysis, and 
they may be misled by a normative argument whose positive 
 
 52 See Part I.B.  
 53 Similar arguments have been made against the importation of systematic re-
views into management science. See Tranfield, Denyer, and Smart, 14 Brit J Mgmt at 
212–14 (cited in note 50). 
 54 See Jack Goldsmith and Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal 
Scholarship, 69 U Chi L Rev 153, 155–56 (2002). 
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premises are unclear. Systematic review clarifies the relation-
ship between positive and normative and so helps normative ar-
guments be made more clearly and rigorously.55 As for authors 
who might wish to be intentionally unclear, our analysis makes 
it easier for the reader to disentangle unsystematic steps in the 
author’s analysis. 
III.  DEVELOPING A METHOD OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEW FOR LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 
In this Part we first outline a process for how to conduct a 
systematic review of legal doctrine and then provide an example 
of this process for a recent piece of legal scholarship. 
A. A Four-Step Process for Conducting a Systematic Review of 
Legal Doctrine 
We propose a four-step process for making claims about the 
state of legal doctrine: (1) clearly stating the legal question that 
is being answered; (2) defining the sample of cases that will be 
used; (3) explaining how the cases in the sample will be 
weighted; (4) conducting the analysis of the sample of cases and 
stating the conclusion. We briefly explain each of these four 
steps below. 
1. Stating the question. 
The first step in providing the evidence for a legal claim is 
defining the exact question that the subsequent analysis is try-
ing to answer. There are two things to keep in mind at this 
stage. 
 
 55 See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Inside or outside the System?, 80 U Chi 
L Rev 1743, 1745 n 2 (2013): 
Law professors may of course play either the role of the analyst, as when they 
attempt to explain judicial behavior, or the role of an actor within the system, 
as when they argue cases or write briefs as amici curiae. The latter activities 
may blur the difference between roles as a practical matter (and in some cases 
that blurring is precisely the point). Yet as a conceptual matter, the distinction 
never blurs. Law professors may switch hats very rapidly, or try to wear two 
hats at once, but that behavior is irrelevant to the conceptual distinction we 
draw. 
See also id at 1797 (“At a minimum, analysts who speak both as political scientists and 
as legal theorists must be careful not to switch their hats so rapidly that they end up at-
tempting to wear two hats at the same time.”). 
 52 The University of Chicago Law Review [84:37 
   
First, the question should be precise. The idea of stating a 
legal question will obviously be familiar to anyone in the legal 
profession. Legal questions are asked during Socratic cold calls 
during law school, are used to motivate legal memos, and guide 
many forms of legal briefs. These questions, however, are often 
asked in a fairly broad manner. The key when asking a legal 
question to motivate a systematic review of legal doctrine is to 
make sure to state a question that is sufficiently precise as to 
guide the time frame, jurisdictions, and relevant universe of 
cases that will be used to answer the question. 
Second, it is helpful to think about what evidence is re-
quired to establish a given claim. For example, if the question is 
how courts “typically” decide a particular type of case, answer-
ing the question requires knowing, say, the median way that 
courts have decided the case. Once again, knowing what evi-
dence is required for the question helps to determine exactly 
what sample of cases is relevant and how to analyze them. Be-
low we provide examples of common kinds of claims and the evi-
dence they require. 
Courts generally decide issue X in way Y. This kind of claim 
can be thought of as calling for the median outcome, or “majority 
rule,” for a given kind of case. To establish this kind of claim, it 
is necessary both to establish the universe of relevant cases and 
to classify the outcomes of those cases in some way. 
Courts have increasingly decided issue X in way Y. This kind 
of claim can be thought of as calling for the correlation of out-
comes over time. To establish this kind of claim, it is necessary to 
establish the universe of relevant cases, to classify the outcomes 
of those cases, and to make note of when those cases occurred. 
There is a split in how courts decide issue X. This kind of 
claim can be thought of as making a claim about the variance of 
outcomes. Depending on the scope of this claim, it may be neces-
sary to establish the universe of relevant cases and to classify 
the outcomes of those cases. 
Courts have frequently confronted issue X. This can be 
thought of as a claim about the size of a given sample. Making 
this claim thus requires documenting the number of cases that 
meet the relevant criteria. 
At least one court has decided issue X in way Y. This can be 
thought of as a claim about the existence of a given phenome-
non. To establish this claim, it is not necessary to establish the 
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universe of cases. Instead it is simply necessary to find one case 
that meets a given criteria. 
2. Defining the sample of cases. 
After a question has been clearly stated, the next step is to 
define the relevant sample of cases that were analyzed. There 
are also two major steps to this process. 
First, it is important to establish what process was used to 
assemble the universe of cases. For example, one might say 
what courts one searched for cases from, and over what time pe-
riod. This way it is possible for anyone else to understand exactly 
the universe of cases that was analyzed as support for a given 
doctrinal claim. 
Second, it is important to state any inclusion or exclusion 
criteria that were applied to a sample of cases. For example, if 
the universe includes a large number of cases, it is important to 
say which cases were analyzed. In some situations, the entire 
sample of cases may be analyzed, but in others it might be a 
random sample. Alternatively, it may be the case that certain 
kinds of cases are excluded from the analysis because they are 
not relevant (for example, all potentially express preemption 
cases in an inquiry into field preemption). All of these decisions 
should be clearly documented. 
Finally, in an ideal world (or if a process like ours begins to 
become more commonplace), one might also hope that analysts 
would specifically document the technology of their search pro-
cess. For instance, they might say what databases they 
searched, what terms they used, and on what dates the search 
was conducted. This is considered an important step of system-
atic reviews in the medical literature. But we suspect that there 
may be more reluctance and resistance to translating it into le-
gal scholarship. This is likely partly for reasons of style and eti-
quette, but also because the legal research process is more het-
erogeneous than the research processes in other disciplines. 
Although it would be beneficial if scholars documented this part 
of their process as well, it is not as important as clearly defining 
the universe of cases. 
3. Explaining the weighting. 
Once the sample of cases is established, it is important to 
state how the cases in the sample will be weighted in the analy-
sis. Just as it may not be appropriate to give all clinical studies 
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equal weight during a systematic review of the medical litera-
ture on a given subject if the quality of the studies differs, it may 
not be appropriate to give all cases the same weight. For in-
stance, it may be appropriate to weight cases more heavily if 
they are: of greater precedential status; more recent; cited more 
frequently or written by more frequently cited judges; or en-
gaged in more analysis on the relevant topic. Once again, the 
key is transparency. Legal analysis need not be the simple sum 
of equally weighted cases, but the weighting should be explained 
to readers. 
4. Conducting the analysis and stating the conclusion. 
The final step is analyzing the sample and answering the 
question posed. There are three pieces of information that 
should be provided about this process. 
First, one should provide the criteria that were used to ana-
lyze the cases. This may be as simple as saying, “I counted any 
case that mentioned issue X as relevant” or “I counted cases as 
relevant only if the central issue of the case was X.” 
Second, one should say how the cases were analyzed. For 
example, one approach may be to conduct a keyword search over 
a set of cases, while another would be to carefully read all of the 
relevant cases. 
Third, a conclusion should be stated that is not broader than 
what the evidence can support. For example, if only federal dis-
trict court opinions from 2010 to 2015 were analyzed during this 
process, the conclusion that follows is that “district court deci-
sions between 2010 to 2015 handle issue X in way Y” and not 
“courts handle issue X in way Y.” To be sure, scholarship fre-
quently asks readers to make inferences from one set of data 
points to a broader one—the fact that a certain set of decisions 
handle issue X in way Y may be argued to imply that other 
courts do so as well. But once again, a clear analysis should 
make clear what claim is being made about the cases and what 
the requested inference is. 
B. A Sample Review 
We hope that this four-step process can serve as a relatively 
simple way to advance the rigor—and hence the credibility and 
transparency—of doctrinal analysis. In their own work, Professors 
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Bar-Gill, Ben-Shahar, and Marotta-Wurgler are using a system-
atic review to write a Restatement,56 and we applaud the effort. 
We think similar methods can add to the value of legal scholar-
ship, and we will try to demonstrate with a concrete example. 
One of us (Baude) previously published an article that in-
vestigated whether “originalism” is “our law,” in part through a 
synthesis of Supreme Court opinions.57 We think that the per-
suasiveness of that analysis might have been helped by the 
principles of systematic review. And so in the course of writing 
this Essay we decided to conduct a systematic review relevant to 
some of the claims in that article. Below, we describe the steps 
of that review and its results. 
1. Stating the question. 
One of the claims in the article was that the Supreme 
Court’s cases, with no exceptions or relatively few exceptions, 
were consistent with what Baude described as “inclusive 
originalism.”58 More specifically, it claimed: “First, in cases 
where the Court acknowledges a conflict between original mean-
ing or textual meaning and another source of constitutional 
meaning, the text and original meaning prevail. Second, across 
the larger run of cases that do not feature an explicit clash of 
methodologies, the Court never contradicts originalism.”59 
To check this claim more systematically, we examined a set 
of 280 Supreme Court cases60 with the help of a research assis-
tant and answered the following questions for each case: (1) Did 
the case decide a constitutional question? (2) If so, did the Court 
either reject the original meaning or say that the original mean-
ing would not matter to its analysis? 
2. Defining the sample. 
The previous article attempted to focus on Supreme Court 
cases that reflect our current positive law commitments, which 
include both modern cases and older decisions that continue to 
 
 56 See generally Bar-Gill, Ben-Shahar, and Marotta-Wurgler, 84 U Chi L Rev 7 
(cited in note 16). 
 57 William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum L Rev 2349, 2370–86 (2015). 
 58 Id at 2391. 
 59 Id at 2371. This was not the only claim in the article, but it is the one most im-
mediately susceptible to systematic review. 
 60 See Part III.B.2 for how we defined that sample. 
 56 The University of Chicago Law Review [84:37 
   
be recognized as “canonical.”61 For purposes of our review, we fo-
cused on a subset of these cases and used a media salience met-
ric called the “NYT Measure”: whether a case was listed on the 
front page of The New York Times.62 We defined the sample to 
include all 280 cases decided between 1989 and 2009 (the most 
recent period available) that appeared on the front page of The 
New York Times. We then excluded the eighty-four cases that 
did not decide a constitutional issue. 
This is of course an incomplete sample, and we note that 
several important cases discussed in the article63 did not appear 
in the dataset. But the metric is a “valid, reliable, and unbiased 
measure of salience,”64 and therefore useful for a systematic re-
view of salient cases. 
3. Explaining the weighting. 
Our narrow definition of the sample—focusing on only sa-
lient cases—means that almost all cases that discussed the orig-
inal meaning of a constitutional provision could get equal 
weight. However, depending on the specific question, it could be 
appropriate to give older cases or cases whose reasoning is part-
ly repudiated or contested less weight in the final analysis. 
4. Conducting the analysis. 
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 2. Of the 
196 constitutional law cases in our sample, our systematic re-
view revealed only 1 in which the Court seemed to say that the 
original meaning of the constitutional provision (known or not) 
did not matter: Lawrence v Texas.65 It is worth noting that this 
case was discussed at length in the original article.66 
Our review also uncovered eight other borderline cases: 
County of Allegheny v American Civil Liberties Union, Greater 
 
 61 See Baude, 115 Colum L Rev at 2371, 2391 (cited in note 57). 
 62 The metric was developed by Professors Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal. See 
Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 Am J Polit Sci 66, 72–73 
(2000). See also Lee Epstein, et al, Table 2-13 Major Decisions of the Supreme Court: 
New York Times Measure, 1946–2009 Terms (CQ 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/37MT-JBGJ (listing the cases included in the metric). 
 63 See, for example, Baude, 115 Colum L Rev at 2376 (cited in note 57) (discussing 
Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 (2004)). 
 64 Epstein and Segal, 44 Am J Polit Sci at 72 (cited in note 62). 
 65 539 US 558, 571–72 (2003). 
 66 Baude, 115 Colum L Rev at 2381–82 (cited in note 57). 
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Pittsburgh Chapter67 (since implicitly partly overruled by a 2014 
decision68); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v 
Casey69 (also discussed at length in the article70); BMW of North 
America, Inc v Gore;71 Kelo v City of New London;72 and a string 
of Eighth Amendment cases involving “evolving standards of de-
cency.”73 Each of these borderline cases probably does not reject 
inclusive originalism,74 but presented a sufficiently close call 
that our review flagged them as unclear. This demonstrates an 
additional useful function of the review—identifying cases that 
might deserve further explanation—in addition to demonstrat-
ing one of the article’s claims in a more systematic way. 
TABLE 2.  SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF ORIGINALISM IN SALIENT 
SUPREME COURT CASES 
Period 
NYT 
Cases 
Decided 
Constitutional 
Question 
Rejected 
Original 
Meaning 
Borderline 
Case 
1989–1991 73 54 0 1 
1992–1994 46 28 0 2 
1995–1997 37 28 0 1 
1998–2000 38 25 0 0 
2001–2003 38 31 1 1 
2004–2006 26 18 0 2 
2007–2009 22 12 0 1 
Total 280 196 1 8 
CONCLUSION 
Although we believe that legal analysis could be improved if 
methodological standards for analyzing case law were developed, 
we acknowledge that our process has drawbacks. Most notably, 
 
 67 492 US 573, 590 (1989). 
 68 See Town of Greece, New York v Galloway, 134 S Ct 1811, 1821 (2014). 
 69 505 US 833, 847 (1992). 
 70 Baude, 115 Colum L Rev at 2384 (cited in note 57). 
 71 517 US 559, 599–600 (1996) (Scalia dissenting). 
 72 545 US 469, 479–80 (2005). 
 73 Kennedy v Louisiana, 554 US 407, 419 (2008); Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 
561 (2005); Atkins v Virginia, 536 US 304, 311–12 (2002); Hudson v McMillian, 503 US 
1, 8 (1992). 
 74 See Baude, 115 Colum L Rev at 2356–57 & n 24 (cited in note 57) (discussing the 
Eighth Amendment). 
 58 The University of Chicago Law Review [84:37 
   
documenting the steps we describe can consume time and space 
that could be spent on other things. Nor is systematic review 
appropriate for advocates making normative or prescriptive 
claims about what legal doctrine should be. 
But we hope to convince others of the benefits of this 
framework when making positive claims about legal doctrine a 
central part of the analysis in law reviews, Restatements, and 
judicial opinions. Law review articles provide research for law-
yers, judges, and policy-makers to rely on. They would be more 
useful—and perhaps more likely to be cited—if they provided all 
the evidence necessary to support their central claims. System-
atic reviews could help the reporters of Restatements alleviate 
the concern that they color their analysis to reach their desired 
conclusions. Systematic reviews could help courts by lending cred-
ibility and reducing any perception of bias about their decisions. 
Even if many authors are reluctant to adopt these tech-
niques directly, we believe their insights can be useful in other 
ways as well. For instance, for claims that are not central to an 
analysis, it still may be best to cite secondary sources that did 
conduct a systematic review. This is because these sources 
would provide better evidence than articles that may have made 
the same claim while simply citing other articles or legal mate-
rials. And when one is skeptically questioning a doctrinal claim 
that does not document its methodology, our framework may 
provide a useful point of departure—it can help critics and skep-
tics zero in on which part of an argument most needs to be sup-
ported and proven. 
Finally, we emphasize that we recognize that there are 
many different ways to incorporate some of the insights of sys-
tematic reviews. We do not intend this Essay to be the final 
statement on the matter, but instead hope to generate debate on 
how more rigorous methods can be incorporated into traditional 
legal analysis. 
